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To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The
Relationship Between Confidentiality in
Mediation and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
Discourage litigation. Persuade neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is
often the real loser - in fees, expenses, and a waste of time. As
a peacemaker the lawyer has superior opportunity to become a
good [person].'
I. Introduction
As increasing numbers of lawsuits crowd courts, people are ex-
ploring alternatives to the adversarial process.2 Mediation,' in partic-
ular, has become an effective alternative to lengthy and potentially
destructive court proceedings.4 Mediation allows parties to solve
their own problems, with minimal interference from third parties.5
The participation of lawyers as mediators of disputes involving other
lawyers, however, generates ethical dilemmas.
This Comment discusses the effect of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct6 on the lawyer's duty to maintain confidentiality
in mediation. Specifically, this Comment focuses on the conflict be-
tween the lawyer's duty to disclose misconduct revealed during medi-
ation,7 and his duty to keep disclosed information confidential.8 The
I. A. Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture (July 1, 1850), reprinted in Marcellino, Media-
tion and Arbitration-Ethical Considerations, 32 BOSTON BAR J. Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 5.
2. Compare ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, Dispute Resolution Direc-
tory (1981) (141 programs in existence) with ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution,
Dispute Resolution Program Directory (1986-87) (over 300 programs in existence).
3. Mediation is defined as "the process by which a neutral mediator assists the parties in
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement as to issues of a dispute. The role of the mediator is
to aid the parties in identifying the issues, reducing misunderstandings, clarifying priorities,
exploring areas of compromise, and finding points of agreement." KAN. SUP. CT. R. 901(a).
4. Other forms of dispute resolution can also be effective substitutes for adversarial jus-
tice. These substitutes include arbitration, rent-a-judge, and the mini-trial. Of these alterna-
tives, mediation provides the least amount of third party involvement. See generally S.
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985).
5. Id.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULEs] (1983). The
Model Rules were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on
August 2, 1983. The Rules, like all model legislation, are intended to serve as a nationwide
framework for implementation of standards of professional conduct.
7. See infra notes 56-119 and accompanying text.
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lawyer's duty to disclose another lawyer's misconduct is mandated
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.9 The lawyer's duty to
keep information confidential is essential to effective resolution of the
parties' dispute through mediation.' 0
This Comment begins with an overview of lawyer dispute reso-
lution programs and the need for confidentiality in mediation. The
Comment then addresses the disclosure requirements of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), and the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)." Next, the Comment
analyzes the disclosure problems and examines solutions that other
states have implemented for similar problems. 12 Finally, a different
solution is proposed and its advantages and disadvantages are
explained.
II. History, Background, and the Status Quo of Mediation and the
Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
A. Mediation
1. Increased Popularity of Mediation in Dispute Resolu-
tion.-In mediation, a neutral third party with no stake in the out-
come of the dispute and no power to impose a solution on the parties
helps the disputants to resolve their conflict.'" In the face of rising
court costs and increased delays, mediation has become popular in
recent years.' Once used only for specific types of disputes, media-
tion is rapidly finding employment as a problem solving method for
disputes that were formerly resolved only through the adversarial
process.' 5
8. See infra notes 21-55 and accompanying text.
9. See supra note 6.
10. Since the mediator cannot compel the parties to give information, a promise of confi-
dentiality serves as an impetus for the parties to reveal information and feelings that they
might otherwise not reveal.
II. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
The Model Code was the predecessor to the Model Rules and consists of three separate but
interrelated parts: Canons (axiomatic norms), Ethical Considerations (aspirational objectives),
and Disciplinary Rules (mandatory rules of conduct).
12. These problems represent the conflict between the need for confidentiality in various
lawyer help programs and the Model Rules' disclosure provisions.
13. See supra note 3.
14. See supra note 2.
15. Traditionally in the United States, mediation has been limited to the area of dis-
putes between labor and management, and disputes between or among members of certain
ethnic groups or communities. In the past ten to fifteen years, however, mediation has become
increasingly popular in other areas. Divorce cases, environmental disputes, neighborhood dis-
putes, and civil rights matters are among these new areas of application. Riskin, Mediation
and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 30-34 (1982). See also K. KRESSEL. THE PROCESS OF DI-
VORCE, 185-202 (1985) (discussing the success of mediation as a substitute for the adversary
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Mediation has become popular for several reasons. First, agree-
ments reached through mediation usually have a higher compliance
rate than judgments handed down by the courts. 16 The mediating
parties invest a great deal of time, effort, and money into reaching
an agreement and are more likely to abide by the terms of the agree-
ment.17 Second, the mediation process preserves ongoing relation-
ships among the disputing parties. Because of the inherent flexibility
in the mediation process, it is possible for agreements to include con-
ditions other than the payment of money. Consequently, the win-lose
situation inherent in the adversary process is avoided.' 8 Also, future
relations between the parties can improve because a successful medi-
ation session reveals a new and relatively inexpensive process by
which the parties can resolve future disputes. Third, mediation in-
volves considerably less time and expense than other forms of dispute
resolution.' 9 The costs in attorney's fees alone often makes it un-
economical for parties to try to settle a minor dispute through the
adversary process. By utilizing informal mediation, the parties can
save money and preserve future relations with each other.2 0
2. The Need for Confidentiality in Mediation.-Perhaps the
most appealing aspect of mediation is its promise of confidentiality.
Mediators emphasize that all information revealed in a mediation
session should remain confidential. 2' A mediating party presumes
process in divorce); A.B.A. STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Standing Commit-
tee on Dispute Resolution 1988) (at least forty-two states have laws providing for mediation of
disputes in various areas).
16. McEwan & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 263-64 (1981).
17. This investment includes the parties' time as well as their financial outlay. This same
investment also works as an incentive to the parties finally to come to an agreement, as not
coming to an agreement would be viewed as a loss. Data shows that mediated agreements have
higher compliance rates for this reason. Id.
18. According to one commentator, however:
Contrary to the expectation that flexible and creative settlements would occur,
few mediation agreements (only 12%) in Maine have involved any conditions
besides payment. This is not because other issues were never present in these
disputes; respondents in 40% of the mediated cases reported the presence of
"other issues" besides money in their dispute. It appears however, that with few
exceptions such matters were converted into dollars and cents for purposes of the
agreement.
Id. at 253.
19. The time element referred to here is not the actual time it takes to resolve the dis-
pute, as the adversary process often can efficiently resolve disputes. Nevertheless, the parties
may wait a long time to get into court, and such a time lag may make matters worse.
20. In time, these small disputes may destroy ongoing relationships.
21. In a 1981 survey conducted by the American Bar Association, the majority of re-
sponses stressed the importance of confidentiality to the effectiveness of a mediation program.
Freedman, Confidentiality: A Closer Look, in ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution,
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that everything he says during the course of the process will remain
confidential.22 Unlike a judge or an arbitrator, the mediator has no
ability to coerce the parties. Therefore, the mediator must guarantee
confidentiality to the parties so that they will be willing to reveal
their true interests.2" Confidentiality, then, is as essential to a media-
tor as it is to an attorney,2' a doctor,25 or a psychiatrist 26
At least four reasons justify the need for confidentiality in medi-
ation. First, it would be nearly impossible for the mediator to dis-
cover all of the underlying problems at issue without a guarantee of
confidentiality.2 7  Second, confidentiality allows the mediator to
maintain neutrality in the eyes of the disputants. It is important that
the disputants view the mediator as an unbiased person.28 If one of
the disputants views the mediator as biased, he would surely not
trust him and, therefore, the mediator's task would be nearly impos-
sible to achieve. Third, a mediator who guarantees confidentiality is
protected from the distractions of frequent subpoenas that could im-
pede his efficiency.2" Finally, the confidentiality aspect of mediation
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Mediation and the Law: Will Reason Prevail? 70 (1983).
22. Not all information will be kept confidential. For example, every state has passed a
statute that mandates child abuse to be reported to authorities. See Murphy, Mediation and
the Duty to Disclose, CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION: A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 87 (L.
Freedman, C. Haile, & H. Bookstaff eds. 1985).
23. See supra. note 10. The mediator's role is to aid the parties in identifying areas of
disagreement. A promise of confidentiality is necessary for the mediator to gain access to the
parties real interests.
24. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (the attorney-
client privilege exists to protect the information the client gives to his lawyer).
25. See. e.g., Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D. Miss.'1970) (the doctor-
patient privilege encourages full and confidential disclosure of all information that might aid
the physician in making his diagnosis).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 90 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (recogniz-
ing that "therapy will usually be seriously jeopardized by the lack of any guarantee of
confidentiality").
27. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
28. Congress created the Community Relations Service and gave the Service powers to
provide assistance to communities and residents to resolve disputes. Congress specifically pro-
vided that
[n]o officer or employee of the Service shall engage in the performance of inves-
tigative or prosecuting functions of any department or agency in any litigation
arising out of a dispute in which he acted on behalf of the Service. Any officer
.who shall make public in any manner whatever any information in viola-
tion of this subsection, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon con-
viction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than
one year.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(g)-(2) (1982). See also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit mediator's report for community
relations service on the basis that it would violate the confidentiality requirement of the gov-
erning statute).
29. If a mediator is constantly called into court to testify about information revealed
during mediation, he has less time to mediate disputes. The lost time can be crucial when the
mediator has a crowded docket. As a result, other disputants often suffer delays in resolving
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makes it a very attractive alternative to other forms of dispute reso-
lution. Parties often prefer to keep disputes out of the newspapers;
by settling these disputes through mediation, privacy is protected.30
Confidentiality in mediation is protected in several ways.31 None
of the methods, however, are foolproof. For example, rules of evi-
dence usually protect only the admissibility of the information deal-
ing with proof of the validity of the plaintiff's claim.32 Moreover,
these rules do not exclude evidence in subsequent litigation over re-
lated claims raised after the mediation. 3 Furthermore, evidentiary
rules usually do not provide protection from public disclosure of in-
formation and from use of information in administrative and legisla-
tive hearings.
Private agreements are a second method used to protect confi-
dentiality in mediation. At the outset of mediation, disputants agree
that nothing said during the mediation will be disclosed. Courts do
not always uphold these agreements, however.3 4
Many states have enacted legislation that specifically deals with
the issue of confidentiality in mediation. 5 Some of these statutes
provide for limited protection of confidentiality,3 6 while others have
provided for blanket protection. 37 There is constant debate over
their disputes.
30. These reasons might include the sensitivity of the issue and its effect on the individ-
ual, or reasons other than personal reasons (e.g. dispute would defame his profession).
31. See generally Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J.
Dis. RES. I (1986) [hereinafter Green]; Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confi-
dentiality In Mediation, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. I (1988) [hereinafter Prigoff]; C. MCCuNE
& N. ROGERS, MEDIATION LAW POLICY AND PRACTICE (1988).
32. See. e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408. See also 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408 [08] (listing
states that have adopted rules paralleling FED. R. EVID. 408.)
33. See E.E.O.C. v. Air Line Pilot's Ass'n., 489 F.Supp. 1003, 1010 n.8 (D. Minn.
1980) (evidence from conciliation admitted to allocate damages), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 661 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1981).
34. See Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 78 N.J. Super. 485, 500-03, 189
A.2d 448, 456-58 (contract not enforceable, parole evidence rule governs courts access to nego-
tiation evidence), cert. denied, 40 N.J. 226, 191 A.2d 63 (1963); Note, Protecting Confidenti-
ality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 450-52 (1984) (agreements to preserve confidenti-
ality are generally held to be void as suppression of evidence, which is against public policy),
But see NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc. 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (complete exclusion of
mediator's testimony necessary to preserve effective system of labor mediation outweighed in-
terest in obtaining mediator's evidence); People v. Snyder, 129 Misc. 2d 137, 139, 492 N.Y.S.
2d 890, 892 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("[Tlhe legislatures clear intention is to guarantee the confidenti-
ality of all such records and communications.").
35. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1991); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-
307 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-53(c) (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12
(West 1987); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849-b (McKinney Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1805-1813 (West Supp. 1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp.
1991).
36. See. e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
37. See. e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991); MAss. GEN. LAWS
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which methods should be employed to keep disclosed information
confidential."8 It is essential that such information remain confiden-
tial if mediation is to continue to be an attractive alternative to dis-
pute resolution.
3. Lawyer Dispute Resolution Programs.-The past decade
has ushered in a new era in the legal profession. Intensified competi-
tion among law firms has resulted in a more businesslike atmosphere,
bringing with it the good and the bad. Battles over money, strategy,
power, policy, and personnel are more common and more likely to
result in permanent separation of attorneys from their places of em-
ployment. The increase in disputes among law firms and lawyers has
given rise to a need in the profession for dispute resolution programs
that will keep this unappealing litigation out of the courtroom and
away from the public eye.
39
Several state bar associations have responded to this call for in-
formal dispute resolution."' Some programs developed to handle
ANN. ch. 233 § 23C (West 1986).
38. Compare Green, supra note 31 with Prigoff, supra note 31.
39. In a report of the New York City Bar Association Committee on Arbitration and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, the committee concluded that an alternative dispute resolution
program was needed for these disputes. Specifically, the report stated:
To the extent that disputes among lawyers can be kept out of the courts, a judi-
cial system which at least in New York City is already severely overburdened
will be relieved of such cases ....
The benefits to the profession seems equally obvious. Not only is it un-
seemly for lawyers to engage in litigation among themselves; it betokens an in-
ability to adjust their conflicting interests short of litigation, and thus a failure to
fulfill one of their most important societal functions when faced with conflicts
among themselves. Media exposure of litigation between lawyers can only erode
further the public image of the profession.
New York City Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, Propo-
sal for Association-Sponsored Arbitration of Disputes Among Lawyers, 42 RECORD 877, 884
(1987) [hereinafter NYC Comm., Proposal].
40. See, e.g., Denver Bar Ass'n Intraprofessional Disputes Comm., Plan for Screening
Intraprofessional Disputes (as amended Apr. 21, 1982 and Jan. 19, 1984) [hereinafter Denver
Plan] ("The purpose of the Plan is to investigate on a confidential basis and, where possible,
resolve disputes between attorneys to the end that the public and the legal profession will be
protected from intraprofessional disputes which can hinder and delay the orderly administra-
tion of justice and legal affairs."); New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Arbitration and Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, Rules for Association-Sponsored Mediation of Disputes Between
Lawyers, 43 RECORD 984 (1988) [hereinafter NYC Mediation Rules] (discussing use of me-
diation as a less intrusive alternative to arbitration in the resolution of disputes among law-
yers); NYC Comm., Proposal, supra note 39; PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASS'N. LAWYER DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROGRAM RULES (amended Mar. 17, 1988) [hereinafter PA. RULES]; San Fran-
cisco Bar Ass'n Subcomm. on Arbitration of Law Firm Dissolutions and Fee Disputes Among
Attorneys, Special Rules of Procedure IA, (June 19, 1987) [hereinafter San Francisco Rules]
("These Special Rules are designed to respond to many requests from attorneys that the Com-
mittee assist in resolving [dissolution and attorney fee] disputes."); CLEVELAND BAR ASS'N.
LAWYER DISPUTE ARBITRATION [hereinafter CLEVELAND STATEMENT].
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these disputes were arbitration programs; 4I however, mediation has
become more popular. 42 The reason why mediation has become more
popular is, perhaps, best expressed by the New York City Bar Asso-
ciation in its proposal to add mediation to its program. The proposal
stated that "[in a temporal sense, the committee provides a proce-
dural 'horse' that belongs before the arbitration 'cart' that our prior
arbitration report has constructed. 43
The benefits of mediation as an alternative to litigation apply
equally well to mediation among lawyers. 44 The confidentiality as-
pect of mediation keeps such disputes out of the media, which helps
prevent further erosion of the public image of lawyers. 45 In addition,
the time saving aspect of mediation is especially attractive to legal
disputes. 46 Mediation ensures that client representation does not suf-
fer because of time spent by lawyers in personal litigation. The types
of disputes that usually arise between attorneys also make mediation
an appropriate forum for resolution.
The types of disputes that mediation programs handle include
disputes involving law firm dissolution, departures of one or more
attorneys from a law firm, and fee disputes between members of dif-
ferent firms.47 It is relatively easy to imagine how disputes involving
law firm dissolutions come about, 48 but for many, it is hard to imag-
ine the animosity that develops during litigation between partners
undergoing a breakup. During these proceedings, it is not uncommon
for attorneys to accuse their partners of theft, conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty, malicious interference with contract, and other egre-
gious acts. 49 The ramifications can be devastating to the attorneys'
legal careers, even if the charges are eventually found to be without
41. See, e.g., San Francisco Rules, supra note 40; CLEVELAND STATEMENT, supra note
40.
42. See PA. RULES, supra note 40, at A.4 (requiring at least one mediation session
before going to arbitration); NYC Mediation Rules, supra note 40, at 984 (i[W]e are hopeful
that disputant's use of the proposed mediation procedure will, in many cases, resolve their
problem and avoid even arbitration."); Denver Plan, supra note 40.
43. NYC Mediation Rules, supra note 40, at 984.
44. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., PA. RULES, supra note 40, at A.2.; NYC Mediation Rules. supra note 40,
at 987.
48. Law firm dissolutions can come about because of differences in view about firm pol-
icy and strategy as well as simple personal problems the members might have with each other.
49. See, e.g., Munyan v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, 99 A.D. 2d 716, 472
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1984); Gartenberg v. Squadron, No. 21323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County
1976); Londin v. Carro Spanbock Londin Fass & Geller, 124 Misc. 2d 1013, 478 N.Y.S. 2d
452 (1984); Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61
TEMP. L.Q. 1055 (1988).
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merit.
Fee disputes among attorneys can be especially hostile. Fee dis-
putes generally fall into two different categories: disputes that result
from a relationship between two or more attorneys, and disputes that
do not result from a relationship between attorneys. For example, if
a client hires two attorneys for two unrelated matters, a dispute may
arise if the client expects to pay the second attorney from the judg-
ment he receives in the case handled by the first attorney. Specifi-
cally, one hypothetical suggested a case in which a divorce attorney
awaited payment of his fees from the recovery in the client's per-
sonal injury action, which was handled by another attorney.5" Fee
disputes resulting from an existing relationship between two or more
attorneys include disputes over fee splitting in contingent fee cases
involving co-counseling, as well as disputes between an associate who
leaves a firm before concluding a contingent fee case that he started
while employed by the firm.51
The Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct52 provide a
good example of a fee dispute arising from a pre-existing relation-
ship. The Pennsylvania rule regarding attorney's fees is more lenient
than the corresponding rule in the Model Rules. 53 Pennsylvania, un-
like the Model Rules, does not require the division of fees between
lawyers to be "in proportion to the services performed by each law-
yer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer [to] as-
sume joint responsibility for the representation." ' As a result, one
lawyer or firm can enter into an informal agreement to, in effect,
"sell" some of a potential client's legal work to another lawyer.55 If
representation of the client leads to recovery, disputes can arise as to
what portion of the fees is due to the lawyer who originally referred
the client to the representing attorney. Although many times this
problem can be solved by a simple agreement, it can also lead to
potentially nasty litigation.
Disputes among lawyers are particularly well suited for resolu-
50. See Judd & Vaksdal, Resolving Disputes Between Lawyers: The DBA Intraprofes-
sional Committee, 18 COLO. LAW. 923, 924 (1989) (hypothetical mediation situation involving
dispute arising between divorce action counsel and personal injury action counsel).
51. Id. at 924 (hypothetical arbitration situation involving co-counsel dispute).
52. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988).
53. Compare PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1988) with MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983) [hereinafter MR 1.5(e)].
54. MR 1.5(e)(l) (1983).
55. Normally, if the attorney who refers the client to another attorney expects to be paid
if there is a recovery, he will probably draft a written agreement. No agreement may be
drafted, however, because of a perceived trust between the individuals or because of mere
oversight.
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tion through mediation. Legal disputes of this type, however, also
have the potential to raise ethical issues. In particular, issues dealing
with a lawyer's duty to disclose to appropriate disciplinary authori-
ties another lawyer's misconduct discovered during mediation pro-
ceedings are a major concern.
B. Misconduct Disclosure Requirements
Our society has always been deeply ambivalent towards those
who betray confidences. Whether the person is the childhood
"snitch", the police officer's "confidential source," or the corporate
"whistle blower," these people are often met with scorn from society
and are often cast out of private cliques. Such breaches of confi-
dence, no matter who is the perpetrator, leaves everyone less secure
in their reliance on others.
Most people would think that lawyers would be opposed to re-
porting each other's misconduct. Nevertheless, since the beginning of
this century, the American Bar Association has imposed a require-
ment to "squeal" on fellow lawyers who violate attorney codes of
conduct. 56 Both canons 28 and 29 of the original Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics had language creating duties that required lawyers to
report the misconduct of other lawyers.57 Canon 28 required lawyers
with knowledge of another lawyer's practices of "stirring up litiga-
tion" to inform the authorities of such misconduct so that he could
be disbarred. 8 Canon 29 charged all lawyers with a duty to uphold
the honor of the profession.59 To properly uphold the honor of the
profession, the canon mandated that "lawyers should expose without
fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct
in the profession .. -60 Notwithstanding the strong message that
these canons were meant to send to the legal profession, these provi-
sions did not effectively achieve their goal.6" A 1970 report by the
ABA Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement found
that although lawyers had knowledge of misconduct on the part of
other attorneys, relatively few complaints were submitted to discipli-
56. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
57. See ABA CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1908) [hereinafter Canon
28]; ABA CANON OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 29 (1908) [hereinafter Canon 29].
58. Canon 28, supra note 57.
59. Canon 29, supra note 57.
60. Id.
61. 95 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 783, 963 (1970). One of the problems specifi-
cally listed by the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement was the
"Ireluctance on the part of lawyers and judges to report instances of professional miscon-
duct." Id.
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nary agents." The report also concluded that "[t]his fact has been
cited as a major problem by nearly every disciplinary agency in the
United States surveyed by this Committee. '6 3 The report recom-
mended that, among other things, "sanctions should be imposed in
appropriate circumstances, against attorneys and judges who fail to
report attorney misconduct of which they are aware." '64
1. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Disclosure Pro-
visions.-The concerns and recommendations of the Committee
were partially satisfied by the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, which became effective in January 1970.65 The Model Code
consists of three separate but interrelated parts: Canons,66 Ethical
Considerations,67 and Disciplinary Rules.68 Canon 1 of the Model
Code states that: "A lawyer should assist in maintaining the integ-
rity and competence of the legal profession."16 9 Ethical Consideration
1-4 directs that lawyers should report unprivileged information about
violations of the Disciplinary Rules to maintain the integrity of the
profession70 Disciplinary Rule 1-103 (DR 1-103) requires all law-
yers to report unprivileged knowledge of another lawyer's miscon-




65. MODEL CODE, supra note 11.
66. Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, the
legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the
Ethical considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived." Id. Preliminary Statement.
67. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objec-
tives toward which every member of the profession should strive." Id.
68. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory rules that establish "the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
69. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1980) [hereinafter Ca-
non I].
70. EC 1-4 directs:
The integrity of the profession can be maintained only if conduct of lawyers in
violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the attention of proper officials.
A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged knowledge
of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Discipli-
nary Rules. A lawyer should, upon request, serve on and assist committees and
boards having responsibility for administration of the Disciplinary Rules.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Consideration 1-4 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter EC 1-4].
71. DR 1-103 Disclosure of Information to Authorities
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate
or act upon such violation.
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning another
lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon proper
request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the
CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIATION




The Model Code provisions contained in DR 1-103(A) were ju-
dicially recognized in Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries.73 In Estates Theatres, the federal district court held that
an attorney who knew that the opposing attorney was representing
his clients in violation of the conflict of interest rules74 had a duty to
report such misconduct to the court for its determination.75 The
court acknowledged that "[wihile the Code does not have the force
and effect of a statute, it is recognized by bench and bar as setting
forth proper standards of professional conduct."7
DR 1-103(A) requires that all unprivileged knowledge of an-
other lawyer's misconduct be reported. 77 Several court opinions and
ethics opinions have interpreted the requirements of DR 1-103(A). 78
ABA Informal Opinion 1393 explained the meaning of "un-
privileged" information in the context of DR 1-103.71 The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility examined the
disclosure requirements of state and local bar association fee dispute
arbitration programs. The specific issue that the Committee ad-
dressed was whether the lawyer had a duty to report Discilinary
Rules violations that were revealed during an arbitration session,
notwithstanding the fact that the bylaws specifically prohibited dis-
closure of any information pertaining to the arbitration. 0 The Com-
mittee determined that the Code protects information which falls
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege and also protects cli-
ent secrets. The question under consideration, however, was not one
dealing with either of these privileges.8 ' The Committee explained
conduct of lawyers or judges.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1980) [hereinafter DR 1-1031.
72. See supra note 68.
73. 345 F.Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
74. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980).
75. Estates Theaters, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
76. Id. at 95 n.1; see also E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 377 n.7
(S.D. Tex. 1969).
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
78. Ethics opinions can be rendered by the ABA in response to an inquiry. State Bar
Associations can also render such opinions. These opinions usually do not have the force and
effect of law but are the best guide available to a lawyer in the absence of a court opinion. See.
e.g., Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-37 (1989) (caveat to opin-
ion stating that opinion is only advisory and is not binding on the Disciplinary Board of the
State Supreme Court).
79. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1393 (1977).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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that what constitutes privileged knowledge of information is a matter
of law. Accordingly, the rules governing the Committee precluded it
from issuing opinions on questions of law.82 Therefore, it is probably
safe to say that when dealing with DR 1-103(A), an attorney is not
bound to disclose information covered by a privilege recognized in
his state.
Other ethics opinions have interpreted the term "knowledge"
within the context of DR 1-103.11 Opinions have made it clear that
the knowledge required is more than just a suspicion.8" The attorney
must be sure that misconduct has occurred and that it is most likely
a violation of the Code.8" The wording of DR 1-103(A) has lead to a
debate over who has a duty to report. In ABA Informal Opinion
1279, the Commission determined that an attorney has a duty to
report not only another attorney's misconduct, but also his own mis-
conduct if not protected by a privilege. 86 Indeed, in Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel v. Casety, 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
that an attorney has a duty to report his own misconduct. 88 The
question of whether an attorney can assert the privilege against self-
incrimination has been litigated for many years, and has also been
the subject of various commentaries.89
The disclosure provisions of DR 1-103 generated other
problems. Beyond the problem associated with self-incrimination,9" it
was apparent that lawyers still failed to report each other's miscon-
duct.91 Even when attorney's did report, there were few cases in
which discipline was actually imposed.92 Outside of the reporting
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Comm'n., Op. 85-95 (1985); N.Y. City
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-42 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Comm'n, Op. 85-95 (1985); N.Y. City
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-42 (1980).
85. See. e.g., Ala. State Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Comm'n Op. 85-95 (1985); N.Y. City
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 82-79 (1982) ("Lawyers should refrain from
casting unwarranted aspersions on their colleagues.").
86. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1279 (1973).
87. 511 Pa. 177, 512 A.2d 607 (1986).
88. Id. at 185, 512 A.2d at 611.
89. See In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76 (Alaska 1974); Note, Self-Incrimination. Privilege,
Immunity and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 Mici. L. REV. 84 (1973); Com-
ment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings: Whatever
Happened to Spevak?, 23 VILL. L. REV. 127 (1978).
90. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
91. But see In re Himmel, 125 111. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988) (lawyer suspended
from practice for one year as a result of not complying with the disclosure requirements of I-
103(A)). In the wake of the Himmel decision, 331 complaints were received under rule I-
103(A). Marcotte, The Duty to Inform, A.B.A. J., May 1989, at 17.
92. See, e.g.. In re Himmel, 125 III. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988); Attorney Griev-
ance Comm. v. Kahn, 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d 1336 (1981); In re Bonafield, 75 N.J. 490, 383
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problem, another problem existed. Disciplinary Boards often encoun-
tered difficulties in obtaining necessary evidence because lawyers
were reluctant to testify in disciplinary hearings unless they had pre-
viously reported the misconduct. If they had not reported the mis-
conduct, the failure to do so might have subjected them to discipli-
nary action. 93
Because the Commission disagreed with the format of the Code
and found problems with its enforcement, the Commission concluded
that piecemeal amendment of the Code would not sufficiently clarify
the legal profession's ethical responsibilities in light of changed con-
ditions. The Commission therefore drafted a new set of rules
designed to replace the Model Code. 4
2. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Disclosure Provi-
sions.-Although the Model Code is still the basis for a minority of
states' professional responsibility laws, 5 the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Model Rules) form the basis for a majority of
the states' laws.96 Many of the states that have adopted the Model
Rules have adopted the Rules in their entirety. Some states, how-
ever, have adopted only portions of the Model Rules and have chosen
to retain most of the Model Code. 7
The Model Rules were promulgated in 1983 by the American
A.2d 1143 (1978). See also Duty to Report/Respond, Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, 101:201,
101:203 (ABA/BNA 1989).
93. See Hood, Renewed Emphasis on Professional Responsibility, 35 LA. L. REV. 719,
741-42 (1975).
94. ABA Comm. on Evaluation of Professional Standards, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (1984) [hereinafter ANNOTATED RULES].
95. See, e.g., ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
96. See, e.g., ARIZ. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985); ARK. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (1986); CONN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986); DEL. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985); FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987); IDAHO
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986); IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987);
KAN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988); LA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1987); MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987); MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT (1988); MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985); MISS. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (1987); Mo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986); MONT. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985); NEV. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986); N.H.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1986); N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1984);
N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1987); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1985); N.D. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988); OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1988); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988); S.D. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (1988); UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988); VA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983); WASH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985);
WIS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988); Wyo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1987); W. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989).
97. See, e.g., OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1986); VA. CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983); N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1985).
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Bar Association after approximately six years of evaluation and dis-
cussion.98 The Model Rules' format is different from that of the
Model Code.99 The Model Rules consist of a series of black letter
rules and accompanying comments in the so-called "restatement
form." 100 Some of the Model Rules are imperatives requiring certain
behavior while others are merely recommendations as to the conduct
of lawyers. 101
For example, Model Rule 8.3 (MR 8.3), which is the disclosure
rule counterpart to DR 1-103, is an imperative rule." 2 MR 8.3(a)
requires that "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyers honesty, trustworthi-
ness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appro-
priate professional authority."'' 0 The comment to MR 8.3 explains
that if a lawyer was required to report every violation of the Rules,
the failure to do so would itself be a professional offense. " The
comment further notes that such a requirement did exist in many
jurisdictions at one time, but proved to be unenforceable.' 05
In interpreting MR 8.3 the comment makes clear that the re-
porting requirements are limited "to those offenses that a self-regu-
lating profession must endeavor to prevent."' 08 Model Rule 8.3 re-
quires a lawyer to use judgment before deciding to report another
lawyer's misconduct. 7 The term "substantial" in the Rule refers to
the seriousness of the offense and not the amount of evidence availa-
ble to the lawyer.' 08 Like DR 1-103, MR 8.3 has exceptions.
Model Rule 8.3(c) states that the rule does not apply to disclos-
ure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.109 Rule 1.6 deals
with information that is protected by the Attorney-Client privi-
98. See ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 94, at 3.
99. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 6.
100. Id.
101. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 6.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1983) [hereinafter MR 8.3].
103. Id.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 8.3 comment (1983) [hereinafter
comment].
105. Id. (the requirement referred to in this comment is that of DR 1-103).
106. Id.
107. Id. See also G. HAZARD, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 560-64 (1985). "Applying the law to themselves, lawyers
thus exercise an enormous amount of discretion and make an unending series of judgement
calls." Id. at 560; Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-36 (1988);
Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-37 (1988).
108. See Comment supra note 102.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1983).
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lege. 110 Although MR 8.3 acknowledges the Attorney-Client excep-
tion, the overall exceptions to MR 8.3 appear to be more narrow
than those supplied by DR 1-103.1" In the context of exceptions and
privileges to the reporting requirements, however, MR 8.3 is
broader. 112 There appear to be no cases or ethics opinions interpret-
ing MR 8.3,"1 so it is hard to predict the Rule's effectiveness at this
time. 14
Some of the problems with DR 1-103 have been solved by MR
8.3."11 The self-incrimination problem inherent in the wording of DR
1-103 is no longer present in MR 8.3, which requires only that a
lawyer report "another" lawyer's misconduct."' Reporting may be
encouraged under the Model Rule's more narrow requirements;" 7
however, this is yet to occur. The problem of the reluctance of mem-
bers of the bar to offer evidence to disciplinary boards, discussed ear-
lier, is still a problem, and will remain a problem in any disclosure
rule that does not provide immunity for attorneys offering such
evidence.""
Regardless of the costs and benefits of any disclosure provision,
most states do have some kind of reporting requirement in this
area." '9 These disclosure requirements seem, on the surface, to con-
tradict directly the need for confidentiality in mediation involving
lawyer/lawyer disputes.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter Rule 1.61.
11I. Compare id. with DR 1-103, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note I 11.
113. But see, Md. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 89-46 (1989); N.M. Bar Ass'n Advi-
sory Opinions Comm., Op. 1988-8 (1988); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance
Comm., Op. 88-37 (1989); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-23
(1988); Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 88-36 (1988).
114. This author was unable to find any cases involving a violation MR 8.3. This is not
surprising in light of the limited number of cases reported under DR 1-103. See supra note 92
and accompanying text. Another factor contributing to the lack of a case law is the relatively
short time MR 8.3 has been in effect. See supra note 96.
115. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
116. Compare MR 8.3 with DR 1-103.
117. Despite the perceived disregard of DR 1-103 and MR 8.3, studies indicate that
most lawyers are willing to report serious violations of professional responsibility. See Lynch,
The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.I. 491, 539 (1986); Note, The Lawyers Duty to Re-
port Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1978).
118. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
119. But see Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 440 (1986) (California
lawyers have no ethical duty to report unethical conduct).
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III. Problems Raised by the Model Rules' Disclosure Provisions
and Mediation's Need for Confidentiality
A. Analysis of the Problem
A review of the history and background of confidentiality in me-
diation and the disclosure requirements of the Model Rules shows
that both are essential.' Both of these requirements, however, seem
to be facially contradictory to each other when viewed in the light of
lawyer dispute mediation.
In a lawyer-dispute mediation, the problem a lawyer faces is
similar to the problem faced by any mediator addressing a dispute
that does not involve the mediation confidentiality privilege.12' In
this type of situation, the mediator cannot honestly tell the parties
that everything said in the mediation will be kept confidential. 2 ' The
Model Rules' disclosure requirements cause lawyer mediators in law-
yer dispute resolution programs to face two equally unappealing al-
ternatives. First, the mediator can inform the disputing lawyers at
the outset of the mediation that any statements made during the ses-
sion will be kept confidential, unless the mediator has a duty to dis-
close under the Model Rules.123 Second, the mediator can inform the
disputants that all mediation communications will be kept confiden-
tial, subject only to a waiver by the parties. In the second situation,
the mediator has to hope that nothing comes up during the media-
tion that will trigger the duty to disclose.' 2 Neither alternative is
acceptable, however, if lawyer dispute resolution programs are to be
successful.
For mediation to be successful, total candor by all participants
is necessary.' 28 Without a meaningful guarantee of confidentiality,
the perception of the mediator as a neutral party will be lost.'26
Moreover, the disputant will have to measure every word he says for
fear that he might reveal some misconduct on his part that the medi-
ator or the other lawyer would be obligated to report. Under these
120. See supra notes 21-119 and accompanying text.
121. Privilege here refers to the statutes, case law, and rules of evidence that guarantee
confidentiality in most jurisdictions. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
123. See PA. RULES, supra note 40, Rule B.13.
124. See NYC Mediation Rules, supra note 40, Rule 9 (New York has not adopted the
Model Rules so such a statement would not be untruthful if the courts consider the informa-
tion to be privileged in the lawyer mediation context).
125. Total candor can be achieved only through a guarantee of confidentiality. See
supra note 23.
126. See ABA Standing Comm. on Dispute Resolution Report to the House of Dele-
gates, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 65, 69 (1988).
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conditions, the mediator has a hard time exposing the underlying
causes of the dispute, which the parties must reveal to reach a mean-
ingful settlement."' 7 A complete lack of confidentiality, however, can
have serious consequences on lawyer mediation programs.
Some lawyers may choose not to try mediation. They may feel
that they are better off going through litigation, 128 rather than risk-
ing a disclosure of misconduct during mediation which could and
should be reported. Furthermore, some of the most qualified lawyer-
mediators might choose not to get involved in mediation programs
for fear that they will have to report other lawyers misconduct and
testify at disciplinary hearings as a result of disclosure.' 29 It is there-
fore necessary to resolve the conflict between the desire for confiden-
tiality and the need for disclosure.
There appears to be no case law addressing this conflict.'1
3
States that have not adopted the Model Rules but still utilize the
Model Code may find it easier to resolve this conflict, however. The
Model Code allows states to make mediation communications privi-
leged and thus side step the reporting requirements.' A majority of
the states, a2 however, must deal with the confidentiality-disclosure
conflict or the effectivenss of lawyer mediation programs' will be
limited.
B. Exceptions to the Duty to Disclose
Several theories have been expressed that would provide an ex-
ception to Model Rule 8.3's duty to disclose. These exceptions in-
volve interpretations of other Model Rule provisions and interpreta-
tions of the Model Rules' overall purposes. These exceptions include
two types: explicit exceptions and implicit exceptions.
1. Explicit Exceptions to the Duty to Disclose.-Although no
explicit exception to the duty to disclose appears in MR 8.3,13 there
is a view of mediation that might obviate the duty to disclose. The
127. See supra text accompanying note 27.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
129. Testifying at another lawyer's disciplinary hearing not only would put lawyer
mediators in an uncomfortable position, but also would destroy the perception of neutrality
necessary for effective mediation.
130. But see N.J. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 494 (1982) (granting attorney
mediators the same immunities nonattorney mediators enjoy in nonlawyer dispute mediation
settings).
131. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1393
(1977) (the issue of privilege is a matter of law).
132. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying test.
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lawyer-mediator can be viewed as representing both of the parties in
the mediation. 13' This position is supported by some ethics opinions,
although these opinions appear to be limited to the facts involved in
the particular situations. 3 '
Lawyer-mediators do not consider themselves to be representa-
tives of the parties to a mediation. The definition of mediation im-
plies that the lawyers are not representing the parties.3 6 Model Rule
2.2,1a3 which refers to the lawyer as an intermediary, addresses a
lawyer-client relationship that in fact does not exist in mediation. 3 8
The comment to MR 2.2 states that the rule applies to situations in
which a lawyer-client relationship exists.'39 The comment further
states that it specifically "does not apply to a lawyer acting as arbi-
trator or mediator between or among parties who are not clients of
the lawyer, even where the lawyer has been appointed with the con-
currence of the parties.""" Further support for this idea is found in
134. See Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Mediation, 26
ARiz. L. REV. 329 (1984). Professor Riskin refers to this as the traditional approach to media-
tion. Riskin explains that "[tihe traditional ethics opinions conceive of the neutral lawyer as
engaging in 'multiple representation.'" Id. at 338.
135. See, e.g., N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 1982-3-16 (1982) (this opinion deals
with divorce mediation in which a prior lawyer-client relationship existed between both parties
to the mediation). For a comprehensive survey of ethics opinions in the divorce mediation area
that lies outside the scope of this Comment, see Silberman, Professional Responsibility
Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107 (1982).
136. See supra note 3.
137. Model Rule 2.2 provides:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications
of the common representation, including the advantages and risks in-
volved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each
client's consent to the common representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on
terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be
able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there
is little risk of material prejudice to the interest of any of the clients if the
contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation
can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other re-
sponsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as an intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client
concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making
them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or
if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon with-
drawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the mat-
ter that was the subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1983) [hereinafter, MR 2.2].
138. Id.
139. MR 2.2 comment ("A lawyer acts as an intermediary in seeking to establish or
adjust a relationship between clients.
140. Id.
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lawyer dispute mediation program rules, which emphasize that the
lawyer is not representing either party."
Even if a lawyer was acting as an intermediary in accordance
with MR 2.2, the rule's comment provides that the lawyer-client
privilege does not apply to protect any communications should litiga-
tion arise.1" ' Furthermore, even if a lawyer-client relationship does
exist, it is unlikely that the court would allow the attorney-client
privilege to be invoked by an attorney to avoid the disclosure re-
quirements under MR 8.3 .14 Therefore, the attorney would be guilty
of violating MR 8.3 if he did not expose the misconduct of an attor-
ney that was revealed to him during mediation.
2. Implicit Exceptions to the Duty to Disclose.-Even though
no explicit exceptions to MR 8.3's duty to disclose exist, at least one
noted scholar in the area believes that MR 8.3 should be read to
imply a privilege for lawyers acting as mediators in lawyer mediation
programs. 14 4 Professor Geoffrey Hazard admits that a literal reading
of MR 8.3 would require a lawyer-mediator to report any lawyer
misconduct revealed to him during a mediation session, but he be-
lieves that to require a lawyer-mediator to report the misconduct
would give MR 8.3 too strict a reading.14 1 Professor Hazard admit-
ted that the Kutak Commission, in debating and drafting the Model
Rules, never considered the situation in which a lawyer would gain
knowledge of another lawyer's misconduct through the mediation
process."4 6 It is not surprising, therefore, that no discussion of this
situation appears in the comment to MR 8.3 or the legislative history
of the Model Rules.147 Professor Hazard also believes that, as
worded, MR 8.3 is too strict and unclear, making it very difficult for
lawyers to decide exactly when they must disclose another lawyer's
misconduct. 48
141. See, e.g., PA. RULES, supra note 40, Rule B.14.
142. See supra note 137.
143. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
144. Telephone interview with Geoffrey C. Hazard, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale
Law School (Nov. 13, 1989) (hereinafter Hazard interview].
145. Id.
146. Id. The Kutak Commission, named for its Chairman, is the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, which was appointed in the summer of 1977 by then
ABA President William Spann, Jr. This commission, along with the ABA House of Delegates
Drafting Committee, eventually drafted the Model Rules. Professor Hazard was the Reporter
of the Kutak Commission. See ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 94, Chairman's Introduction.
147. Hazard Interview, supra note 144; ABA. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 196 (1987) (rule adopted as proposed by the Kutak Commission).
148. Hazard Interview, supra note 144.
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Although Professor Hazard's interpretation of MR 8.3 is an ap-
pealing alternative to the literal interpretation of the rule, it is un-
likely that the courts would adopt such a liberal interpretation of the
rule. In In re Himmel,14 9 the defendant learned of the other lawyers'
misconduct from his client, who requested that Himmel refrain from
reporting the other attorney's misconduct. The court nevertheless
found Himmel to be in violation of the duty to report and suspended
him from the practice of law for one year.150 The court held that the
attorney-client privilege did not protect Himmel, even though he
would not have known of the misconduct but for his client's revela-
tion.151 The Himmel decision indicates that courts narrowly interpret
the disclosure rules. Therefore, it is unlikely that courts will recog-
nize an implied exception to MR 8.3's disclosure requirements in the
context of lawyer dispute mediation.
Because there appear to be no exceptions to MR 8.3 for lawyer-
mediators, provisions must be implemented to make lawyer-media-
tion programs successful. There are several alternatives in areas re-
lated to lawyer-mediation that merit examination.
C. Solutions for Lawyer-Mediators
1. Legislation as a Reaction to the Problem.-A possible solu-
tion to the dilemma faced by lawyer-mediators is to enact legislation
that would give lawyers the privilege not to disclose misconduct dis-
covered during mediation. To pigeonhole the privilege into an al-
ready existing mediation confidentiality statute, however, would re-
quire an extremely broad interpretation of these statutes.152 Even in
those states that grant broad protection to mediation, one would
have to read into the pertinent statute a privilege that information
discovered through lawyer-dispute mediation could not be revealed
at lawyer disciplinary hearings. 
53
There are two problems with such a proposal. First, states that
149. 125 III. 2d 531, 536, 533 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1988). The attorney whose misconduct
Himmel had learned of through his client was the attorney who had represented the client in a
previous successful personal injury action, and had subsequently converted the recovery. Him-
mel was retained by the client to collect the settlement from the other attorney. Id. at 535, 533
N.E.2d at 791.
150. Id. at 546, 533 N.E.2d at 796.
151. The court found that the information was knowledge of illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude and thus was not covered by the privilege. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 543, 533
N.E. 2d at 793 but see Md. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 89-46 (1989) (Ethics Committee
faced with a similar situation as the court in Himmel found that the attorney-client privilege
protected the attorney's nondisclosure).
152. See, e.g.. supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., supra note 37.
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grant only a limited privilege to mediation proceedings,' 54 or that
rely on rules of evidence to protect mediation, 55 would have diffi-
culty stretching their statutes to cover the lawyer dispute mediation
dilemma. Moreover, states that do not have such statutes would be
at a greater disadvantage. This problem can be overcome by drafting
a new statute to cover the situation. Some lawyers, however, may
object to such a statute as being worthless.1 56
A further problem is judicial acceptance of reform statutes. In
some states, rules governing the legal profession are in the sole prov-
ince of that state's supreme court.1 57 Accordingly, any rules or stat-
utes that the legislature tries to apply to members of the bar can be
struck down as an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the
judiciary and a violation of separation of powers.158 Therefore, it is
unlikely that a state supreme court disciplinary board would stretch
a mediation confidentiality statute to protect lawyers who do not dis-
close misconduct that they are obligated to disclose under MR 8.3.
2. Exceptions Attempted in Other Contexts.-Some states
have succeeded in securing exemptions from MR 8.3's disclosure
provisions in a situation other than in mediation between lawyers.
That situation deals with drug and alcohol treatment. The legal pro-
fession has not escaped the drug and alcohol problems prevalent in
today's society.15 Since a large number of disciplinary cases involve
drug and alcohol abuse, 16° several state bar associations have insti-
tuted lawyer help programs to detect and treat these illnesses.'
These programs, like all drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs,
require confidentiality to insure that lawyers are candid with those
who can help them. Moreover, these programs attract laywers who
would not otherwise take part without a guarantee of
154. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 36.
155. See. e.g., supra note 36 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
157. See. e.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 10, cl. c.
158. See, e.g., Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n, 503 Pa. 358, 469 A.2d 593 (1983) (Fi-
nancial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 404-05 (Purdon
Supp. 1989), as applied to Judges, are unconstitutional infringement on judiciary and violate
the separation of powers doctrine).
159. See Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 83-48 (1983). This opin-
ion originally applied only to elected members of the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Committee, but
was later expanded to include all participants and volunteers who participate in the program.
Tenn. Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 83-48(a) (1987).
160. Tenn. Formal Op. 83-48, supra note 159.
161. See, e.g., KAN. SUP. CT. R. 206; N.H. Bar Ass'n Professional Continuity Comm.,
Lawyers Assistance Program (undated) (copy on file at Dickinson Law Review office).
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confidentiality."0 2
Confidentiality in lawyer help programs is achieved in several
ways. State supreme courts have adopted rules dealing specifically
with the situation. These rules provide complete confidentiality in all
proceedings, information, meetings, reports, and records of such
committees. 6 ' In other states, ethics committees have issued opin-
ions that grant help program members immunity from the disclosure
provisions of the rules of professional conduct.164 Still other states
have provided for an exception by amending MR 8.3 explicitly to
exempt members of these lawyer help programs from their duty to
disclose other lawyers' misconduct." 5 Regardless of how confidenti-
ality is accomplished, the various rules appear to be successful.
According to one program director, originally there was a prob-
lem with lack of participation in the program. a6 An increase in the
use of the program came about once the rules were changed so that
members could guarantee confidentiality to participants.6 7 Not only
did program participation rise, but members of the program were
able to work under much better circumstances knowing that they
would not have to report misconduct that came to their attention
during the help sessions.'6 8 The success of lawyer help programs pro-
vides a promising alternative to the existing dilemma faced by law-
yer mediators with respect to disclosure requirements.
162. Tenn. Formal Op. 83-48, supra note 159.
163. See, e.g., KAN. SUP. CT. R. 206(c).
164. See N.Y. Bar Ass'n Comm. or Professional Ethics, Op. 531 (1981); Mo. Bar Ad-
min. Advisory Comm., Informal Op. 5 (1982); Tenn. Formal Op. 83-48, supra note 159.
165. Oklahoma's version of Model Rule 8.3 provides:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate authority.
(c) This rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.
(d) The provisions of Rule 8.3(a) shall not apply to lawyers who obtain such
knowledge while acting as a member, investigator, agent, employee, or as a des-
ignee of the Oklahoma Bar Association Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee,
in the course of assisting another lawyer. Any such knowledge received by a
committee member shall enjoy the same confidence as information protected by
the attorney-client privilege under applicable law.
OKLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1988). See also KAN. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1988); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c)
(1986); OR. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(E)(1) (revised 1989); Wis.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(c) (1988); W VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 8.3(d) (1989).
166. Telephone interview with George Roemer, Director of the Oregon State Lawyers




IV. An Alternative to the Proposals
If mediation is to be successful as an alternative to litigation
between lawyers, the strict requirements of MR 8.3 must be
amended. Ignoring the problem until a state disciplinary board sanc-
tions a lawyer-mediator, or a lawyer-disputant, is unacceptable. Stat-
utory enactments, however, are likely to encounter separation of
powers problems in some states. 16 9 Perhaps the most practical cure
for this problem would be to amend MR 8.3 to provide an exception
to the duty to disclose in the mediation context, much the same way
that exceptions are made for drug and alcohol programs.17 0 By
amending MR 8.3, all the benefits of confidentiality in mediation can
be achieved1 71 at a comparatively low cost to the integrity of the
legal profession.
If MR 8.3 was amended to exclude from its provisions lawyer
dispute mediation program participants and mediators, it is likely
that these programs will enjoy increased use, as lawyer help pro-
grams have.172 More attorneys would be willing to participate as
mediators in these programs knowing that they would not have to
disclose misconduct that they discovered during mediation. Further-
more, a mediator could guarantee disputants that complete confiden-
tiality would be maintained. As a result disputants would be much
more truthful with the mediator. At first glance, it appears that such
a blanket protection for mediation would provide the perfect shelter
for a lawyer who wants to settle a dispute that involves his serious
misconduct and, therefore, would be used as a method to escape dis-
cipline for such misconduct Nonetheless, these problems can be
avoided by simple provisions that already exist in mediation rules.
A provision can be inserted into the mediation rules that pro-
vides that the program administrator will have the right to decline to
mediate a dispute or to cease to mediate a dispute when it appears
that the dispute involves a probable violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.17 3 Furthermore, if the dispute involves serious viola-
tions of the Rules, the opposing party will usually know about the
violations and will have a duty to report such violations anyway.
Since both disputants must agree to mediation, 174 it is unlikely that
one attorney will agree to mediate a dispute if he suspects that the
169. See supra notes 33, 156-57 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., PA. RULES, supra note 40, Rule A.2(b).
174. See. e.g., PA. RULES, supra note 40, Rule B.2.
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other attorney is using- the mediation process as a shelter from disci-
plinary proceedings.
Perhaps the most adverse consequence of an exception to the
duty to disclose is that it might result in some unreported and un-
punished lawyer misconduct. Nevertheless, it is debatable whether
lawyers report misconduct now. Moreover, the small percentage of
cases of unreported misconduct resulting from a mediation privilege
would not substantially decrease the effectiveness of MR 8.3. The
overall benefits of an effective alternative, however, substantially out-
weigh any decrease in the effect of MR 8.3.
V. Conclusion
Alternative methods of dispute resolution are not always as wel-
come as one might think. These alternatives often involve problems
that were never anticipated when litigation and the adversarial pro-
cess were the only means of settling disputes. Nonetheless, it is time
that the legal profession realizes that many attractive alternatives to
litigation exist, and that some accepted patterns and rules of conduct
will have to change to accommodate them.
The relationship between the disclosure provisions of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and the confidentiality privilege is
not a comfortable one. Amendment of MR 8.3, however, is a solu-
tion to this problem. Unfortunately, this solution gives rise to other
problems, including the possible use of mediation as a shelter by un-
ethical lawyers. Until another solution is found, however, the uncer-
tainty in this area will remain a stumbling block to successful alter-
native dispute resolution among lawyers. Although amendment of
the rules will create new problems, perhaps such a solution is a nec-
essary evil.
Cletus C. Hess
